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INTRODUCTION

Police arrest Bailey and charge him with possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute it, a federal offense.' Instead of striking a plea
bargain, he pleads not guilty and proceeds to trial. At trial, Bailey
admits that he committed the offense but claims that he was entrapped
- that is, he would not have committed the crime had an undercover
FBI agent not convinced him to do so. The jury rejects the defense
and finds Bailey guilty. At sentencing, the probation officer presents
the judge with a presentence report2 stating that Bailey appears to be
genuinely remorseful for his actions, that he has acknowledged that
the sale of drugs is wrong, and that he has assisted law enforcement

1. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2002).
2. Before a judge imposes a sentence or grants probation, a probation officer is required
to conduct a presentence investigation and prepare a report, unless the court finds that there
is sufficient information in the record for the meaningful exercise of sentencing authority.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1). The report of the presentence investigation must contain
extensive information about the defendant's background and the relevant sentencing
classifications. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
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officials in their investigation. The judge explains to Bailey that he
believes that Bailey is sorry for his actions and that Bailey has owned
up to his participation in the crime, but that he is unable to reduce
Bailey's sentence because in his circuit a defendant who claims
entrapment is not entitled to a lesser sentence on the grounds of
acceptance of responsibility.3 The judge goes on to explain that by
claiming that he would not have committed the crime without the FBI
agent's inducement, Bailey has disputed his intent to commit the
crime. The judge further explains that intent is an essential factual
element of guilt and such a dispute as to guilt precludes the
acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment because it is an attempt to
shift blame for the commission of the crime to law enforcement
officials. When Bailey's attorney argues that Bailey has a constitutional right to present a defense that should not prejudice his sentence,
the judge responds that Bailey does not have a constitutional right to
leniency, and that the entrapment defense precludes acceptance of
responsibility.
This fictional account highlights the tension between the
entrapment defense and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines'4 discount

3. The acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment allows a judge to decrease a defendant's
base offense level if the defendant clearly demonstrates recognition and affirmative
acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (2002) [hereinafter USSG]. The guidelines do not clearly define
"acceptance of responsibility." They state that a guilty plea "will constitute significant
evidence of acceptance of responsibility." USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3. The guidelines list several
other factors that may be taken into consideration in determining acceptance of responsibility including, inter alia, truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense, voluntary
termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations, and voluntary assistance to
authorities in the recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities of the offense. USSG § 3E1.1,
cmt. n.1 (a)-(h). The guidelines also state, however, that a defendant may qualify in certain
limited circumstances for an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment even though he did not
plead guilty to the crime. USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2.
4. Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, and granted it authority to create sentencing guidelines. Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified in various sections of
18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). The Act contains detailed instructions as to how to create the
guidelines. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2002). In particular, the Act directs the Commission to
create categories of offense behavior and offender characteristics. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1). The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are a grid system with forty-three offense levels on its vertical
axis and six criminal history categories on its horizontal axis. USSG ch. 1, pt. A, 4(h). A
court initially assigns a base offense level for the crime or crimes for which an offender is
being sentenced. USSG § 1BI.1. Next, the court determines the criminal history category
based on the number and type of prior convictions. Id. Once both the offense level and
criminal history have been determined, the judge finds the point of intersection on the grid
and assigns a sentence within the range of months listed. Id. The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines provide for flexibility by granting adjustments and departures. See John N.
Winstead, Note, Nunez-Rodriguez and a Defendant's Acceptance of Responsibility: A
Jailbreakfrom the Confinement of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 85 KY. L.J. 1021,
1024-25 (1996-97).
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for acceptance of responsibility.' To successfully argue entrapment,
there must be evidence that the defendant was not predisposed to
commit the crime.6 Predisposition is critical because entrapment is a
judicially created defense,7 founded upon the notion that the
legislature could not have intended that the government would
enforce its statutes by tempting innocent persons to violate them.'
5. Prior to the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, defendants who pled
guilty were often given more lenient sentences. Robert N. Strassfeld, Robert McNamara and
the Art and Law of Confession: "A Simple Desultory Phillipic (or How I was Robert
McNamara'd into Submission)", 47 DUKE L.J. 491, 507-511 (1997) (discussing the historical
development of the practice of granting more lenient sentences to defendants who plead
guilty). This was due in part to the belief that those who accept responsibility for their
crimes, by pleading guilty, have begun the reformation process and are thus entitled to
leniency. Id. at 510. The acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment codifies the tradition of
offering leniency to defendants in exchange for entry of a guilty plea. See, e.g., United States
v. Guadagno, 970 F.2d 214, 226 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1012
(11th Cir. 1989). This tradition was deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court in Corbitt
v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978). The sentence discount under the acceptance-ofresponsibility adjustment, however, is not as big as the discount a defendant would have
received prior to the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Prior to the
enactment of the guidelines, the average sentence discount for a defendant who pled guilty
was approximately thirty to forty percent below what a defendant who proceeded to trial
and was convicted would receive. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the reduction is
approximately twenty percent. See Strassfield, supra, at 512 n.109 (citing U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY

REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

AND

POLICY STATEMENTS at 48-50 (1987)). The adjustment takes a more expanded view of
acceptance of responsibility than pre-guideline practice, however, by not precluding the
adjustment to a defendant who proceeds to trial or guaranteeing the adjustment for a
defendant who pleads guilty. USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2 (explaining that a defendant who goes
to trial may qualify for the adjustment in rare cases); USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3 (explaining
that a defendant who enters into a guilty plea is not entitled to the adjustment as a matter of
right). By providing that a defendant who goes to trial may qualify for the adjustment,
USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2 safeguards the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment from attack
as an unconstitutional penalty for the exercise of the right to trial. See infra Part III.
6. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
7. The entrapment defense was formally recognized by the Supreme Court in the case of
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). In Sorrells, a government agent posed as a
tourist and visited the home of the defendant. Id. at 439. The agent and the defendant served
in the same military unit during World War I. Id. The agent repeatedly asked Sorrells if he
could obtain some liquor. Id. at 439-40. Initially, Sorrells told the agent that he did not have
any liquor. Id. at 439. After they began speaking about their common war experiences, the
agent made another request. Sorrells then left his home and returned with a half gallon of
whiskey, for which the agent paid him five dollars. Id. The agent testified that he requested
the liquor in order to prosecute Sorrells for procuring and selling liquor. Id. at 440. Sorrells
was convicted of violating the National Prohibition Act. On appeal to the Supreme Court,
Sorrells defended his actions by claiming entrapment. Id. at 438-39. The Supreme Court
unanimously agreed and reversed his conviction. Prior to Sorrells, though the Supreme
Court had suggested that solicitation of crime by the government might be improper under
some circumstances, it had never expressly ruled that an entrapment defense existed. See,
e.g., Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 418-19 (1928); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S.
604, 604-11 (1895). Lower courts, however, had widely recognized the entrapment defense
prior to Sorrells. See, e.g., O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 1931); Cline v.
United States, 20 F.2d 494, 496 (8th Cir. 1927); Cermak v. United States, 4 F.2d 99, 99 (6th
Cir. 1925); Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1915).
8. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428 (1973). Entrapment is thus based on the
rule of statutory construction that prohibits literal interpretation of a statute that produces
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While government officials may use decoys to lure individuals
intending or willing to commit a crime, in order for liability to attach
the criminal design must originate with the accused and not with
government officials. Courts examine evidence of the defendant's
inclination to commit a particular crime in the time period before the
defendant's initial exposure to government agents to determine if a
defendant is predisposed to commit a particular offense.9
The acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment enables a judge to
reduce a sentence if he finds that the defendant owned up to his
participation in the crime and has shown remorse for his actions.1 °
While acceptance of responsibility is not defined, the Sentencing
Guidelines' Application Notes," which are binding upon the courts, 2
absurd results. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435. The notion that Congress could not have intended its
criminal statutes to be applied to people tempted into violation has been sharply criticized.
See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(arguing that the congressional-intent justification is sheer fiction because the only intent
Congress had in enacting criminal statutes was to set forth the elements of the crime).
9. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436 (explaining that predisposition must be established before
government involvement with defendant). In Russell, the defendant actively participated in
the manufacturing of illegal drugs before government agents initiated contact. Id. The Court
found that the defendant had a predisposition to commit the offense irrespective of the law
enforcement techniques employed. Id.; see also Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (finding that the
government must prove defendant otherwise inclined to commit offense prior to contact
with government). In Sherman, the Court examined the defendant's criminal history,
whether the defendant was engaged in the narcotics trade, and the defendant's readiness and
willingness to sell narcotics, independent of any governmental inducement. Sherman, 356
U.S. at 375.
10. In Bailey's case, for example, if Bailey was in possession of less than twenty-five
grams of cocaine, his base offense level would be twelve. See Drug Quantity Table, USSG §
2D1.1(c)(14). This calculation assumes that no victim-related role in the offense, or
obstruction adjustments apply. See USSG §§ 3A, 3B, & 3C (2002). Assuming that Bailey had
one prior felony conviction in the past fifteen years, his criminal history category would be
II. See USSG § 4A1.1(a); Sentencing Table, USSG § 5A. This calculation assumes that the
instant offense was not committed while the defendant was on probation or parole, see
USSG § 4A1.2, or less than two years after release from imprisonment, see USSG §
4Al.1(e). Thus, Bailey would receive a sentence of twelve to eighteen months. See Sentencing Table, USSG § 5A. If Bailey received a two-point adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility, however, his base offense level would be ten and his sentence would be eight
to fourteen months instead of twelve to eighteen months. See id. The acceptance-ofresponsibility adjustment has an even greater impact on defendants who have committed
more serious crimes and have more extensive criminal histories. For example, someone who
commits a level thirty-seven offense and has a criminal history category of V, would receive
a sentence of 324-405 months. If that person were given an acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment of two points, he would receive a sentence of 262-327 months - a difference of
five years and two months at the low end and six years and six months at the high end of the
sentence.
11. The Sentencing Commission issues commentary that guides the sentencing judge in
imposing a sentence. USSG § 1B1.7. One form of commentary is the Application Notes.
12. The Application Notes in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which are under the
Commentary heading, must be given controlling weight unless they violate the Constitution
or a federal statute or are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guideline. USSG §
1B1.7; Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (analogizing the commentary to an
agency's interpretation of its own legislative rule).
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explain that the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment is not
intended to apply to a defendant who goes to trial to contest his
factual guilt and then later expresses remorse after his conviction. 3
Factual guilt has been interpreted by most courts to include both the
mens rea and actus reus of an offense. 4 The Application Notes,
however, instruct that the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment is
allowed for a defendant who proceeds to trial to contest an issue
unrelated to his factual guilt, such as a challenge as to whether a
statute applies to the defendant's conduct. 5 The courts that have
addressed the issue appear to agree that the challenge-to-theapplicability-of-the-statute exception applies when a defendant goes to
trial to contest the legal conclusion drawn from the facts that he
admits. 6
The conflict between the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment
and the entrapment defense occurs because courts view the
acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment as a reward for total
acknowledgment of fault and entrapment as an attempt to shift fault
onto law enforcement officials. 7 The circuit courts disagree on
whether a defendant who unsuccessfully argues entrapment at trial is
eligible for a reduced sentence based upon acceptance of

13. USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 840 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that
intent is a factual element of guilt and cannot be contested without putting the acceptanceof-responsibility adjustment in jeopardy); United States v. Crass, 50 F.3d 81, 83-84 (1st Cir.
1995) (same); United States v. Lindholm, 24 F.3d 1078, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (same).
15. USSG § 3El.l, cmt. n.2.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Purchess, 107 F.3d 1261, 1267 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding
that a "district court should not deny the reduction for acceptance of responsibility because
the defendant challenges a legal conclusion drawn from facts the defendant admits"); United
States v. Smith, 106 F.3d 350 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that where a defendant admits all the
necessary facts of his scheme to the government, "he should not be precluded from having
counsel argue the legal effect of those facts to the sentencing court by risking the benefits
derived by his candid admissions"); United States v. Fells, 78 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a district court erred in denying reduction for a defendant who challenged
venue because the defendant had "freely admitted all the facts but challenged their legal
interpretation"); United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 224 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
district court erred in denying an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment when a defendant
admitted ownership of guns found in the defendant's home and went to trial only to argue
that the statute did not apply to uncontested facts), overruled on other grounds by J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Kirkland, 104 F.3d 1403, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The
defendant, by asking for the downward departure, is in effect claiming that he accepts
responsibility even though he was not responsible for his acts."); United States v. Hansen,
964 F.2d 1017, 1021 (10th Cir. 1992) ("It is difficult for this Court to envision how the
defendant argues that he affirmatively accepted responsibility for his criminal action when
throughout the proceedings he maintained that his criminal action was not his fault, but
rather, it was the result of government inducement."); United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220,
222 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The defendant, rather than accepting 'personal responsibility for his
criminal conduct' urges that the party responsible for the offense was actually the
government." (internal citations omitted)).
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responsibility.18 Some circuits have found that the predisposition
inquiry in entrapment is tantamount to an inquiry about intent.19 Thus,
according to these circuits, entrapment is a dispute about factual guilt
and does not give rise to one of those rare situations where a
defendant goes to trial and remains eligible for the acceptance-ofresponsibility adjustment. The Tenth Circuit, however, has found that
entrapment is not a challenge to factual guilt because the entrapment
defense does nothing more than challenge whether the statute applies
to the defendant's conduct.2"
While the debate in the circuit courts has focused on whether the
entrapment defense disputes factual guilt, there is a constitutional
issue that has remained unexamined. It has long been held that courts
may not use the exercise of constitutional rights against a defendant at
the sentencing stage. 1 Defendants have a constitutional right to
present a defense22 that stands on equal constitutional footing with
other rights protected by the Sixth Amendment. 3 Thus, the question

18. In United States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit joined
the First, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in concluding that entrapment and the
acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment are not necessarily incompatible. The court decided
that by proceeding to trial to assert an entrapment defense, a defendant attempts to preserve
an issue that does not relate to factual guilt. Id. In Kirkland, the D.C. Circuit found that a
claim of entrapment seems particularly inconsistent with a demonstrated acceptance of
responsibility, but fell short of holding that it was impossible that the two could be
consistent. Kirkland, 104 F.3d at 1405-06. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits, however, have held
that the entrapment defense and the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction are incompatible. United States v. Chevre, 146 F.3d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Brace,
145 F.3d 246, 265 (5th Cir. 1998). In Brace, 145 F.3d at 265, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that
although the defendant admitted committing criminal acts, his assertion of entrapment was a
denial of factual guilt because it was a denial of subjective predisposition and the required
element of mens rea.
19. See, e.g., Brace, 145 F.3d at 265.
20. Garcia,182 F.3d 1165.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 910 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that a
sentencing court cannot balance constitutionally protected conduct, such as requesting
counsel or invoking the privilege not to make statements to the police, against evidence of
remorse or acceptance of responsibility); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 124 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that where the original conviction was set aside due to
constitutional error, the imposition of a more severe punishment would serve to penalize the
defendant for exercising his constitutional rights and would be "patently unconstitutional"
(quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969))); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570, 583-85 (1968) (invalidating the death penalty provision of Federal Kidnapping Act
because only those defendants who abandon the constitutional right to contest their guilt
before a jury are assured they will not be executed). The Court went on to explain that
"[t]his construction of Section 3E1.1 will avoid an unconstitutional application of the
Sentencing Guidelines." Id.
22. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
23. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988). The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have

November 20041

The Forgotten ConstitutionalRight

becomes what, if any, impact the constitutional right to present
a defense has on the acceptance-of-responsibility/entrapment discussion.
This Note argues that Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines must be interpreted to allow defendants who claim
entrapment at trial to remain eligible for the acceptance-ofresponsibility adjustment. To interpret Section 3E1.1 in any other way
would run afoul of defendants' constitutional right to present a
defense. Part I argues that the entrapment defense does not put
factual guilt at issue; instead the entrapment defense challenges
whether the statute should apply to the defendant's conduct. Part II
contends that the legislative intent in creating the sentencing
guidelines in general and the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment
in particular are furthered by requiring sentencing judges to make
individualized assessments about the extent to which defendants have
accepted responsibility. Part III argues that the use of the entrapment
defense as an automatic bar to the receipt of the acceptance-ofresponsibility adjustment is a penalty for the exercise of the
defendant's constitutional right to present the entrapment defense.
This Note concludes that because the assertion of entrapment and
acceptance of responsibility are not inherently inconsistent, the use of
a per se rule barring the adjustment is a violation of the defendant's
constitutional right to present a defense.
I.

THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE DOES NOT DISPUTE FACTUAL
GUILT

Sentencing courts that prohibit defendants who unsuccessfully
claim entrapment at trial from receiving the acceptance-ofresponsibility adjustment do so by mischaracterizing the nature of the
entrapment defense. In any criminal case, the government must prove
that the defendant committed a criminal act, the "actus reus," and that
the defendant had a culpable state of mind, or "mens rea," in order to
obtain a conviction.24 Both the actus reus and mens rea are
components of factual guilt. Some courts have found the entrapment
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and the have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
24. See Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint,Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism
of Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 289, 339 (1999) (explaining that in order to hold a
defendant criminally liable, it must be shown that he "was aware of his conduct and the
circumstances in which it was performed" (citing Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing
Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 953, 958-59 (1998))). "The Constitution limits the state's
power to create strict liability offenses; that is, offenses that do not include a mental
element." Bendor, supra, at 339-40 (citing Alan C. Michaels, ConstitutionalInnocence, 112
HARV. L. REV. 828, 830 (1999)).
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defense to be a challenge to factual guilt by confusing mens rea with
predisposition. 5
Entrapment, however, is an affirmative defense that does not
negate an element of the crime.26 The crux of the entrapment defense
is causation, or whether the defendant would have committed the
crime had the government not induced him.27 Once the defendant has
shown that the government induced the commission of the crime, the
burden shifts to the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime before being
approached by law enforcement officials. 8 In practice, the focus is
almost exclusively on predisposition.29 Predisposition to commit a
crime concerns the defendant's propensity to perpetrate a crime as
separate from the government's inducement.3" A court considering an
25. See, e.g., United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247, 265 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) ("[A]n
entrapment defense is a challenge to criminal intent and thus to culpability."); United States
v. Kirkland, 104 F.3d 1403, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that it is "rather obvious that the
entrapment defense is a way of challenging one 'factual element[ I of guilt' - intent"
(alteration in original)).
26. "[T]he absence of entrapment is not an essential element of a charged offense;
instead, entrapment is an affirmative defense." Brace, 145 F.3d at 257; see also United States
v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2000) (entrapment is an affirmative defense); United States
v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 564 (4th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140,
154 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Dumas, 207 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2000) (same);
United States v. Blassingame, 197 F.3d 271, 279 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); Vega v. Suthers, 195
F.3d 573, 583 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Berg, 178 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1999)
(same); United States v. Roper, 135 F.3d 430, 435 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v.
Quinn, 123 F.3d 1415, 1423 (11th Cir. 1997) (same).
27. United States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999). To determine
predisposition, a court may look at the following factors:
(1) the character or reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the suggestion of criminal
activity was originally made by the government; (3) whether the defendant was engaged in
criminal activity for a profit; (4) whether the defendant evidenced a reluctance to commit
the offense, overcome by government persuasion; and (5) the nature of the inducement or
persuasion offered by the government.
United States v. Haddad, 976 F.2d 1088, 1095 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Ian J. McLoughlin,
Note, The Meaning of Predisposition in Practice, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1067, 1071-72 (1999)
(explaining that in entrapment cases the Supreme Court has historically focused on the
"defendant's state of mind or lack of predisposition to commit the alleged crime").
28. United States v. Nelson, 922 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1990); Mathews v. United States,
485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988). To be entitled to an entrapment instruction, however, a defendant
must "come forward with evidence that government agents implanted criminal design in his
mind and induced him to commit the offense." Nelson, 922 F.2d at 317 (quoting United
States v. Felix, 867 F.2d 1068, 1074 (8th Cir. 1989)). "[Elvidence that Government agents
merely afforded an opportunity or facilities for the commission of the crime would be
insufficient to warrant such an instruction." Mathews, 485 U.S. at 66.
29. See Troy A. Wolf, Note, Criminal Law - Persistence Pays: Enforcement Efforts to
Solicit Illegal Activity, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 913,918 (1991).
30. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 432, 442 (1932) (finding that government
officials may not implant in individual's mind disposition to commit offense). Predisposition
focuses on the defendant's state of mind prior to contact with government agents. United
States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d 32, 38 (4th Cir. 1991) (predisposition is defendant's decision to
commit crime and not a product of government persuasion); United States v. Kaminski, 703
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entrapment defense asks, "how the defendant likely would have
reacted to an ordinary [that is, noninduced] opportunity to commit the
crime."'"
Predisposition, however, is not the same as intent to commit a
crime. A defendant who claims entrapment does not argue that he did
not intend to commit the crime for which he is standing trial.32 Rather,
the defendant argues that in spite of his intent to commit the offense
and actual commission of the crime, the government should not be
entitled to obtain a conviction due to its role in encouraging the crime.
Predisposition and intent look at the defendant's state of mind at
different points of time. Predisposition looks back in time to the
defendant's inclination to commit the offense prior to its commission
to determine if the defendant was motivated by his own desires or
induced by a government official.33 Intent, on the other hand, is the
defendant's mental resolution or determination to commit the
criminal act at the time it takes place. 4 While the government bears
the burden of proving an individual's predisposition if he claims

F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1983) (predisposition must exist prior to contact with the
government). Predisposition may be inferred from a prior history of engaging in the same
type of criminal behavior combined with an eager response to the government's offer.
United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986) (inducement implicates whether
defendant was eager or reluctant to engage in criminal offense). The defendant's criminal
state of mind must exist before government agents suggest that the defendant commit a
crime. Kaminski, 703 F.2d at 1008 (discussing existence of defendant's predisposition prior
to government inducement). The amount of inducement the government offers to the
defendant has no correlation to the defendant's predisposition; rather, predisposition is an
independent determination of the defendant's ready acquiescence to commit an offense. Id.
(discussing the relevance of amount of inducement to predisposition inquiry). Predisposition
is usually a question of fact for the jury. See Paul Marcus, Proving Entrapment Under the
Predisposition Test, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 53, 70 (1987) (individual's state of mind at time of
government inducement is a matter given to trier of fact).
31. United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 962 (1st Cir. 1994).
32. "When a defendant pleads entrapment, he is asserting that, although he had criminal
intent, it was 'the Government's deception [that implanted] the criminal design in the mind
of the defendant."' Mathews, 485 U.S. at 62 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
436 (1973)); see also United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 514 (3d Cir. 1981) (explaining that
the entrapment defense "requires admission of guilt of the crime charged and all of its
elements, including the required mental state"); United States v. Mitchell, 514 F.2d 758, 76061 (6th Cir. 1975) (defense of entrapment "admits all [of the] elements of the offense"
(quoting United States v. Lamonge, 458 F.2d 197, 201 (6th Cir. 1972))).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 216 F.3d 80, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (predisposition
goes to state of mind - why the defendant did what he did). The inducement requirement is
met if the government's conduct "created a substantial risk that the offense would be
committed by a person other than one ready to commit it." United States v. Andrews, 765
F.2d 1491, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. Dickens, 524 F.2d 441, 444 (5th
Cir. 1975)); see also United States v. Kelly, 748 F.2d 691, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Inducement
focuses on whether the government's conduct could have caused an undisposed person to
commit a crime."); United States v. Van Slyke, 976 F.2d 1159, 1162 (8th Cir. 1992) (same).
34. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 810 (6th ed. 1990).
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entrapment,35 the fact that the government must prove predisposition
does not transform it into an element of the crime. As currently
formulated, the entrapment defense presupposes that an individual is
factually guilty of the crime for which he is charged.36 Therefore, it is a
fallacy to equate intent and predisposition.
As the entrapment defense does not put intent to commit the
crime at issue, it is not a challenge to factual guilt. An individual who
claims entrapment denies legal, rather than factual, responsibility for
the crime.3 7 Application Note 2 of the acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment explains that in "rare situations" a defendant who is
convicted at trial may clearly demonstrate acceptance of responsibility
if he proceeds to trial to make a "challenge to the applicability of a
statute to his conduct."38 This language mirrors the way the Supreme
Court has written about entrapment, i.e., "the question is whether the
defense, if the facts bear it out, takes the case out of the purview of the
statute" because Congress did not "intend[] that the letter of its
enactment should be used to support such a gross perversion of its
purpose. '"" A defendant who raises an entrapment defense admits that
he has committed a crime but argues that he should not be held
accountable for it.4" The defendant, therefore, goes to trial to contest
the legal conclusion drawn from the facts that he admits.41 Thus, a
defendant who raises entrapment argues that the statute under which
he is being charged should not apply to his conduct.42 As such, the
entrapment defense falls squarely into the exception in Application
Note 2 that allows defendants to remain eligible for the Section 3E1.1
adjustment. Accordingly, the mere fact that a defendant raised an
entrapment defense at trial is not enough, standing alone, to deny him
an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.
35. United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247, 257 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[Tlhe absence of
entrapment is not an essential element of a charged offense; instead, entrapment is an
affirmative defense.").
36. See United States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the
entrapment defense "concedes that the defendant's conduct satisfies the essential factual
elements of guilt"); see also Maureen F.J. Whelan, Note, Lead Us Not Into (Unwarranted)
Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense With a Reasonable-Suspicion
Requirement,133 U. PA. L. REv. 1193, 1205-06 (1985).
37. See Strassfeld, supra note 5, at 518 (explaining the courts' treatment of defenses that
deny legal responsibility in the context of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment).

38. USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2.
39. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932).
40. Entrapment presupposes the commission of a crime. United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
41. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
42 See United States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that
entrapment is a "challenge to the applicability of a statute to the defendant's conduct"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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II. CONGRESSIONAL OBJECTIVES OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Sentencing courts have three choices as to how to treat defendants
who claimed entrapment at trial. The first is to create a per se rule that
prohibits courts from granting an acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment; the second is to automatically grant the acceptance-ofresponsibility adjustment; and the third is to require the courts to
make case-by-case determinations of defendants' contriteness. The
question then becomes which of these three options furthers the goals
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. This Part argues that requiring
judges to make case-by-case determinations of acceptance of
responsibility for defendants who claimed entrapment at trial is
consistent with the statutory objectives of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Section II.A argues that the purposes of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are not furthered by the creation of a per se
rule; instead, they are furthered by requiring courts to make individual
assessments about the extent to which defendants have accepted
responsibility. Section II.B argues that there is nothing inherent in the
nature of the entrapment defense that is inconsistent with the goals of
the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. This Part concludes that
defendants who claim entrapment at trial should be given the
opportunity to prove to the sentencing judge that they have accepted
responsibility for their crimes. To construe Section 3E1.1 otherwise
would vitiate a vital, albeit narrow, realm of discretion carved out for
sentencing judges under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Federal statutes, such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, are
interpreted by examining the language of the statute itself.43 Where
the language is not dispositive, courts look to the congressional intent
"revealed in the history and purposes of the statutory scheme."" The
court's duty "is to find that interpretation which can most fairly be
said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most
harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that
Congress manifested."45 As the statutory language is silent as to
whether a defendant who claims entrapment is eligible for the
adjustment, the terms of the statute are to be interpreted in light of
both Congress's purpose in enacting the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment, and the
historical background of the guidelines and the adjustment, which is
detailed in this Part.

43. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).
44. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 642 (1990).
45. C.I.R. v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984).
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The Twin Goals of Uniformity and Proportionality

Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
sentencing was generally guided by the rehabilitative ideal, which
sought to transform the criminal into a person who, upon return to
society, will conform her behavior to societal norms. 4 As a result, a
trial judge in the federal judicial system had wide discretion in
determining what sentence to impose." In making his determination,
the trial judge was permitted to conduct an inquiry broad in scope,
largely unlimited as to either the kind of information he might
consider, or the source from which it might come.48 This led to gross
disparities in the sentences assigned by judges for similar crimes and
similar offenders, particularly along race and class lines.49
In creating the new sentencing laws, Congress sought to limit this
boundless discretion.5" Thus, the Sentencing Commission focused on
honesty, 5 uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing to achieve the
goal of increasing the criminal justice system's ability to reduce crime
through fair and effective means.5 The goal of uniformity is to narrow
46. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 1.5, 38-40 (1986), reprintedin YALE KAMISAR ET AL., ADVANCED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1531, 1532 (1999) (explaining that the trend in sentencing prior to the enactment of the
sentencing guidelines was to influence future conduct); see also Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (explaining that the dominant objective of criminal law is no longer
retribution, but instead reformation and rehabilitation).
47. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972) (collecting cases). See generally
Daniel J. Fried, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1687-89 (1992) (discussing the different
methodologies pre-guideline courts used to sentence offenders).
48. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 446-47.
49. KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 46, at 1538 (explaining that these gross disparities along
race and class lines led to efforts to reform discretionary sentencing and the disparities it
produced).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000) (stating that one of the goals of the new sentencing
policies is to avoid "unwarranted sentencing disparities"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)
(explaining that "[t]he Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements are
entirely neutral as to race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of
offenders").
51. In an attempt to achieve honesty in sentencing, Congress abolished parole. USSG
ch. 1, pt. A, 3. Parole, one of the vestiges of the rehabilitative system of punishment,
perpetuated indeterminate sentencing by allowing the parole commission, not the sentencing
court, to determine how much of a court-imposed sentence the offender would actually
serve. See, e.g., United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188-90 (1979) (explaining that a
judge cannot predict when an offender will be released, and the Parole Commission is in the
best position to determine release date). "An indeterminate sentence is a maximum and
minimum term and set by the judge, which leaves to the parole board the task of
determining the precise date at which the defendant will actually finish his sentence."
KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 46, at 1536 n.2. Indeterminate sentences "encourage[ ] efforts
to reform and permit[ ] the actual sentence to track the rehabilitative progress of an
offender." Id.
52. USSG ch. 1, pt. A, 3.
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the gap in sentences imposed by judges for similar criminal conduct by
similar offenders. 3 The goal of proportionality requires different
sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity. 4 While uniformity
and proportionality can conflict with one another,5 the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines attempt to address both goals by setting forth a
grid system that considers
the offense and the individual character56
istics of the offender.
The goal of proportionality is not subverted by allowing a
defendant who claims entrapment to receive the adjustment. In fact,
the goal of proportionality is undermined by creating a per se rule
against the granting of the adjustment or automatically granting the
adjustment. While there is no constitutional right to an individualized
sentencing determination in noncapital cases,57 the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines require a judge to examine individual characteristics. 8 The
sentencing grid instructs the judge to look at the characteristics of the
particular defendant before him and of the particular crime
committed. 9 When the judge combines all of the factors he gets an
individualized determination. If warranted by the situation of the
defendant, the judge still has discretion to depart from the guidelines
or adjust the base offense level to create a fair and just sentence.' This
discretion is necessary to achieve proportionality. Proportionality is
destroyed, however, when circuit courts create a per se rule that bars
the adjustment because it takes away sentencing courts' ability to
examine defendants' contriteness, an important circumstance in
fashioning a sentence. Further, the simple assertion of the entrapment
defense coupled with acknowledgment of underlying criminal activity
should not automatically entitle a defendant to an acceptance-of-

53. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1993) (explaining that the purpose of the
Sentencing Commission is to create sentencing guidelines that "avoid[ ] unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar criminal conduct").
54. USSG ch. 1, pt. A, 3.
55. For example, "simple uniformity - sentencing every offender to five years destroys proportionality" because it does not take into account the seriousness of each
defendant's criminal conduct. Id.
56. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
57. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965-66 (1991).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (explaining that one of the Sentencing Commission's goals
is to set flexible sentencing policies in order to permit individualized sentences when
warranted).
59. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
60. The guidelines were intended to reduce disparity in the sentencing of different
defendants for similar offenses. United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir.
1989). They do not, however, entirely abrogate the district court's discretion. The guideline
range "allows the district court some latitude to fine tune the sentence to the individual
defendant and the circumstances of the defendant's offense." Id. at 219.
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responsibility adjustment. Such a rule would violate the rule of
proportionality in the same way that a blanket rule barring the
adjustment would because it would reward the defendant without
regard to his remorse. Thus, to preserve proportionality, sentencing
courts must make case-by-case determinations about the extent to
which defendants have accepted responsibility.
On the surface, it may seem that uniformity in sentencing is
furthered by the creation of a per se rule. If there is a per se rule, the
judge does not use the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment to
reduce the sentence of any defendant who claimed entrapment at trial.
Thus, the result for defendants who claim entrapment is completely
uniform - no reduction for acceptance of responsibility. If courts
granted the adjustment to any defendant who claimed entrapment, the
result would be similarly uniform. In reality, however, uniformity is
concerned with eliminating sentencing disparities for offenders who
commit similar crimes. Therefore, if circuit courts create a rule
providing that all defendants who assert the entrapment defense are to
be treated alike, they are not furthering the goal of uniformity because
the defense that is asserted is not necessarily related to the crime
committed. It is the crime that is to be punished, not the defense.
It is Congress's job, through the Sentencing Commission, to create
categories of offenses and offenders and determine a suitable range of
punishment. It is the sentencing courts' duty to apply these guidelines,
not to create additional rules that are not based upon empirical
analysis. Categorical rules, such as one that renders a class of
defendants ineligible for a sentencing adjustment, reflect broad
generalizations holding true in so many cases that inquiry into whether
they apply in the case at hand would be needless and wasteful.6 It is
improper for a court to make such a determination.62 This is especially
true where, as here, courts have failed to adequately justify the
generalization that a defendant who claims entrapment is never
remorseful or cooperative enough to evidence acceptance of
responsibility. Instead, the courts simply say that entrapment is the
"antithesis" of acceptance of responsibility.63 Such a cursory

61. See, e.g, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 8-22 (1997).
62. The purpose of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is to curb some of the courts'
discretion in sentencing. USSG, ch. 1 pt. A, 3. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), "[t]he court shall
impose a sentence... within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
Further, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), the court must give a statement of
guidelines ....

reasons for imposing a particular sentence.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Rector, 111 F.3d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 222 (3d Cir. 1991). See also supra Part I.
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examination is unacceptable in light of Congress's statutory directive
for individualized sentencing.'
B.

EntrapmentIs Consistent with the Purposes of Section 3E1.1

The purpose of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment is to
reward defendants for showing remorse for their criminal conduct and
for cooperating with law enforcement. 5 This is consistent with the preguideline history of leniency for acceptance of responsibility. Prior to
the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme
Court recognized the importance of a defendant's cooperation with
law enforcement officials in determining an appropriate sentence.6
According to the Supreme Court,
Few facts available to a sentencing judge are more relevant to the
likelihood that a defendant will transgress no more, the hope that he may
respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with a lawful future career, and
the degree
to which he does or does not deem himself at war with his
67
society.

In addition, the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment was supposed
to provide the kind of incentive to plead guilty that had traditionally
been offered by prosecutors and judges before the guidelines went
into effect. 8 The entrapment defense is consistent with the purposes of
the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment as they existed prior to
and after the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Application Note 1(a) to section 3E1.1 states that one of the factors in
determining whether a defendant has clearly demonstrated acceptance
64. The guidelines resolve the conflict between proportionality and uniformity in favor
of individualized sentencing. "The increase in uniformity was not, however, to be achieved
through sacrificing proportionality. The guidelines must authorize appropriately different
sentences for criminal conduct of significantly different severity." Danielle D. Giroux, Note,
My Dictionaryor Yours? The Supreme Court's Interpretationof "Carrying" Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(C)(1) in Muscarello v. United States, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 355, 379 n.233 (Winter

1999) (quoting

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS, June 18, 1987, p. G-21).

65. See Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation,and "Acceptance of Responsibility":
The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1507, 1509 (explaining that the Application Notes to the
guidelines "reflect two distinct, and sometimes competing, visions of what it means to
'accept responsibility' for an offense: either to feel remorse for the offense or to provide
cooperation to police, prosecutors, and court officials"). Discussion of the statutory goals in
enacting section 3E1.1 is lacking in the case law and is often inferred based on the structure
of section 3E1.1.
66. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558 (1980) (finding that it was proper for a
sentencing judge to consider a defendant's lack of cooperation with law enforcement
officials in sentencing because of the "deeply rooted social obligation" to assist authorities).
67. Id. at 558 (quoting United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 51 (1978)) (internal
quotations omitted).
68. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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of responsibility is whether the defendant has "truthfully admit[ed] the
The remaining
conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction... ,,69
with law
on
cooperating
1
focus
Note
Application
factors in
or other
restitution
and
conduct,
criminal
enforcement, terminating
7' This shows that the concern of the acceptancerehabilitative efforts.
of-responsibility adjustment is with an admission of criminal conduct,
remorse, and cooperation. A defendant must admit the "conduct
comprising the offense" in order to claim the defense of entrapment.7 '
The dispute in entrapment is whether the defendant would have
committed the crime in the absence of government inducement, not
whether the defendant performed the criminal act.7"
Further, there is no reason to believe that a defendant who claimed
entrapment at trial is incapable of showing remorse or cooperating
with law enforcement. When an appellate court creates a per se rule, a
district court must deny the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment
even if the defendant has shown remorse and cooperated with law
enforcement. If the concern of the adjustment is to reward defendants
for admitting their criminal conduct, showing remorse, and
cooperating with law enforcement, then the creation of a per se rule
undermines a court's ability to apply the acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment properly. Requiring courts to grant the adjustment
whenever a defendant claims entrapment would do just as much to
undermine the purpose of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment
as would a per se rule prohibiting courts from granting the adjustment.
There is nothing in the entrapment defense that makes it either
inherently compatible or incompatible with the acceptance-ofresponsibility adjustment. As such, district courts must retain the
discretion to make the acceptance-of-responsibility determination in
each case.
Furthermore, nothing in Section 3E1.1 evidences a legislative
intent to categorically prevent a defendant who admits his criminal
conduct, cooperates with law enforcement, and shows remorse for his
crime from receiving an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility
solely on the basis of an entrapment defense. In fact, there are no
69. USSG § 3El.1, cmt. n.1(a). There is no indication of whether the "conduct
comprising the offense" simply refers to the actus reus of a crime or if it includes the mens
rea as well. As it was established in Part I that entrapment does not put mens rea at issue, it
is irrelevant whether "conduct comprising the offense" refers to mens rea.
70. USSG § 3E1.l, cmt. n.l(b)-(h).
71. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) ("[Entrapment] is rooted ... in the
notion that Congress could not have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has
committed all the elements of a proscribedoffense, but was induced to commit them by the
Government." (emphasis added)); see also RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 999 (3d ed. 1995) ("Typically defendants claiming entrapment do
not challenge the prosecutor's proof of the elements of the offense.").
72. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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absolute rules in Section 3E1.1. 73 Most remarkably, Application Note
4 indicates that conduct resulting in an obstruction-of-justice
enhancement "ordinarily indicates" that the defendant is not entitled
to an adjustment, but there might be "extraordinary cases" where the
obstruction-of-justice and acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment
would both apply.74 Section 3C1.1, Obstructing or Impeding the
Administration of Justice, requires a district court to impose a twolevel sentencing enhancement if the defendant "willfully obstructed or
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of
justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the instant offense of conviction" if the obstructive
conduct related to the offense of conviction or a "closely related
offense."75 One type of conduct that merits the adjustment is perjury.76
Other types of conduct include threatening a co-defendant, witness, or
juror, producing false documents, destroying or concealing evidence,
or escaping or attempting to escape from custody.77 A defendant who
engaged in any of the above-mentioned conduct remains eligible for
the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. Certainly that type of
conduct is more severe than the conduct of a defendant who takes the
stand merely to assert that he performed a criminal act, but that it was
out of character for him.
Whether the police entrapped a defendant in a given situation is a
debatable question. The defendant attempts to convince the jury that
he would not have committed the criminal act if the police had not
convinced him to do so. The government attempts to persuade the
jury that the defendant would have performed the criminal act even if
the police had not been involved. A defendant, particularly a first
offender, could genuinely believe that his will was overborne by the
73. Application Note 1, for example, instructs the trial court to examine certain factors,
but cautions that the inquiry is not "limited to" those factors. USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.1.
Application Note 2 explains that conviction by trial "does not automatically preclude" a
defendant from consideration for an adjustment. USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2. Application Note
3 states that entry of a guilty plea does not entitle a defendant to an adjustment "as a matter
of right." USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3. Application Note 6 explains that the timeliness of an
applicant's acceptance of responsibility is a consideration that is "context specific." USSG §
3E1.1, cmt. n.6.
74. USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.4.
75. USSG § 3C1.1.
76. USSG § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(b); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 98 (1993)
(holding that "[u]pon a proper determination that the accused has committed perjury at
trial," the accused's trial testimony can supply the basis for application of the section 3C1.1
enhancement). To decide when an accused's testimony constitutes perjury, Dunnigan
adopted the federal criminal definition of perjury set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1621. Dunnigan,507
U.S. at 94. Under that definition, "[a] witness testifying under oath or affirmation [commits
perjury] if she gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to
provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory." Id.
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1)).
77. USSG § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(a)-(e).
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persuasive tactics of the police. The fact that a jury finds that a
defendant was predisposed and, thus, that he likely would have
committed the offense without government inducement, does not
mean that the defendant was lying. A defendant's testimony that he
would not have engaged in criminal conduct absent the police
inducement would not even support a finding of perjury. Perjury
requires that the defendant willfully intend to give false testimony
concerning a material matter.78 Even if the defendant's testimony
amounted to perjury, however, he would not be foreclosed from
receiving the adjustment.79 If a defendant can obstruct justice and
remain eligible for an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment, then
there is simply no rational reason to prohibit courts from granting the
adjustment to defendants who claimed entrapment at trial.
The bottom line is that acceptance of responsibility is a
discretionary decision, placed in the hands of a district court, that the
Sentencing Commission did not think was amenable to mechanical
rules of application. Requiring courts to make case-by-case
determinations of defendants' remorse preserves the integrity of the
adjustment. A per se rule, however, removes the discretionary
acceptance-of-responsibility determination from the district court and
places it in the hands of the appellate court. Such a removal directly
contravenes the statutory purpose.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT A
DEFENSE

The goals of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment are
furthered by requiring judges to make case-by-case determinations of
contriteness for defendants who claimed entrapment at trial. As such,
the creation of a bright line rule that prohibits district courts from
considering the adjustment for defendants who claim entrapment is a
violation of the constitutional right to present a defense. Because a per
se bar on defendants who assert entrapment singles them out and
categorically prevents them from eligibility for leniency, the per se
rule unconstitutionally punishes defendants.
The constitutional right to present a defense derives from the
Compulsory Process and Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth
Amendment.' The Compulsory Process Clause guarantees a
defendant the right to subpoena witnesses and have them testify on

78. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94.
79. USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.4.
80. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967).
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her behalf."1 In addition, the Confrontation Clause gives defendants
the right to subject prosecution witnesses to cross-examination.8 2
Together, these protections provide what the Supreme Court has
termed the constitutional right to present a defense. 3 Beginning in
1967, with Washington v. Texas,' the Supreme Court held that "the
right to present a defense... is a fundamental element of due process
of law." 5 Not long after, in the seminal decision Chambers v.
Mississippi in 1973, the Court concluded that the fundamental
constitutional right to present a defense includes the right to present
exculpatory evidence. 6 Then in 1988, in Taylor v. Illinois, the Court
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19 ("Just as an
accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging
their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This
right is a fundamental element of due process of law."); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 40709 (1988).
82. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79 (1986).
83. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19. The Court has explained that the rights that
make up the right to present a defense are truth-furthering. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S.
400, 408-09 (1988) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)); Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 48, 53 (1987); Id. at 63 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)
("The right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure. It is
implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure the 'accuracy of the
truth-determining process."' (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970))).
84. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
85. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19. In Washington, the Court held that a state rule
of evidence that excluded "whole categories" of testimony on the basis of a presumption of
unreliability was unconstitutional. Id. at 22.
86. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). Chambers followed Washington v.
Texas and Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972). Webb was the first case to rest a defendant's
right to present evidence solely on the Due Process Clause, rather than referring to the
specifically enumerated rights of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. See Robert N. Clinton, The
Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guaranteein Criminal Trials, 9 IND.
L. REv. 713, 778 (1976). In Webb, the defendant's only witness was a prisoner with an
extensive criminal record. Webb, 409 U.S. at 95. The witness refused to testify altogether
after the trial judge emphatically warned him not to perjure himself. Id. at 95-96. The
Supreme Court determined that the judge's statement coerced the witness into refusing to
testify and thus denied the defendant the right to present evidence in his defense. Id. at 98.
Much like the exclusion of accomplice testimony in Washington, Webb involved the absolute
exclusion of a defense witness' testimony, and therefore could have been decided on Sixth
Amendment grounds. See Clinton, supra, at 781. Chambers is significant because it dealt
with only a partial exclusion of witness testimony, and because the Court disposed of the
case by referring only to the Due Process Clause. See id. at 791. Chambers, therefore, clearly
stands for a defendant's fundamental right to present defense evidence. See id. at 791-92. But
see Peter Westen, Compulsory Process H1, 74 MICH. L. REv. 191, 207 (1975) (concluding that
Washington v. Texas stands for a defendant's "constitutional right to present any evidence
that may be deemed to establish the existence of facts in his favor" (emphasis omitted)).
Since Chambers,the Court has consistently found a fundamental right to present a defense
that includes a right to present defense evidence. In Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979),
the Court considered a case where the trial court excluded critical defense evidence on
hearsay grounds. Once again, the Court reasoned that the exclusion violated the Due
Process Clause because the evidence was highly relevant to a critical issue in the case. See id.
at 97. In Crane v. Kentucky, the Court held that the exclusion of evidence, pertaining to
whether a defendant's confession was voluntary, deprived the defendant of a fair
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stated that "the very integrity of the judicial system and public
confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts,
within the framework of the rules of evidence.""7
Once a defendant has gone to trial and been allowed to present her
defense, it may seem that the constitutional right to present a defense
has been satisfied and the government has no further obligation. In
the context of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment, however,
there is a further obligation not to use the exercise of that right against
the defendant in a way that amounts to an unconstitutional pressure."8
As the Eleventh Circuit explained in United States v. Rodriguez, the
sentencing court is well within its rights to examine "the defendant's
conduct prior to, during, and after the trial to determine if the
defendant has shown any remorse through his actions or statements."8 9
The chances of a court granting an adjustment may well be reduced if
the defendant has exercised all of his rights during the entire process.9"
If a defendant has shown some sign of remorse but has also exercised
constitutional or statutory rights, however, "the sentencing judge may
not balance the exercise of those rights against the defendant's
expression of remorse to determine whether the 'acceptance' is
adequate." 91
Courts can not create an outright penalty for the exercise of a
constitutional right, such as a criminal fine or increased punishment.'
Courts also may not condition the receipt of a government benefit on

opportunity to present a defense. 476 U.S. 683 (1986). In Rock v. Arkansas, the Court
determined that the automatic exclusion of post-hypnotically refreshed testimony violated
the defendant's right to present a defense. 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).
87. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988) (rejecting state's argument that the
constitutional right to present a defense can never be violated by the exclusion of evidence
as a sanction for the violation of a discovery rule).
88. See United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that it is a
well established proposition that taking advantage of a constitutional right cannot be
weighed against a defendant in determining eligibility for the acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment); United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 962 (9th Cir. 1992). But see United States
v. Wright, 133 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that court may deny a 3E1.1 reduction for
conduct inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility, even if the court relies exclusively on
conduct that includes assertion of a constitutional right).
89. United States v. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d 193. 197 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding that the
sentencing court improperly balanced evidence of contrition against defendants' exercise of
their Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and their Sixth
Amendment right to appeal).
90. Id.
91. Id. (emphasis omitted).
92. See McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Obviously the
government burdens a constitutional right when it imposes a direct penalty such as a
criminal fine on its exercise."); United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 463 (1st Cir.
1989) (finding that incarceration for a longer period of time is "one of a wide variety of
penalties which can serve to trigger a constitutional violation").
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against compelled self-incrimination,9" or their right to appeal.99 Most
courts, however, resolve the issue of constitutionality by stating that
the possibility of leniency in the statute does not make denial of the
lenient treatment impermissible punishment, provided that the
sentencing judge has actually determined that the defendant has not
accepted responsibility." ° The force of this reasoning lessens, though,
when an appellate court creates a per se rule prohibiting district judges
from making the acceptance-of-responsibility determination.
It is the district court that decides whether to grant an acceptanceof-responsibility adjustment.1"' The district court is in a unique
position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility and, as
a result, the determination of the sentencing judge is termed a
question of fact and subject to the clearly erroneous standard on
review.1° The refusal of some district courts to apply the factors set
forth in the Application Notes to defendants who claimed an
entrapment defense at trial is the first step in the erosion of
defendants' constitutional right to present a defense. When appellate
courts affirm the district courts' misapplication of the sentencing
guidelines, they transform a one-time violation into a per se rule
prohibiting district courts from granting the adjustment. Once that
happens, the failure to protect defendants' constitutional right to
present the entrapment defense is complete.

8.7% of drug offenders received no adjustment. Id. at 43. The total percentage of all
defendants who received the adjustment was 91.2%. Id. at 42.
98. The Fifth Amendment states that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This amendment has long been
interpreted to mean that a defendant may refuse to "answer official questions put to him in
any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might
incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
The right against compelled self-incrimination is at stake because in order to show remorse
one must often admit her crime at the sentencing stage. See United States v. Larkin, 171 F.3d
556, 559 n.4 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that although section 3E1.1 rewards a defendant who
demonstrates contrition through an honest and full account of his offense conduct, it does
not impose any new penalty on a defendant who chooses to keep silent, and thus does not
offend the Fifth Amendment). The privilege against self-incrimination applies at sentencing
just as it does during any other stage of the prosecution. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 46263 (1981).
99. The right to appeal is in jeopardy because defendants maintain their innocence in
order to preserve their right to appeal.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Watt, 910 F.2d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Monsour, 893 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that section 3E1.1 does not penalize a
defendant for exercising his right to trial); United States v. Paz Uribe, 891 F.2d 396, 400 (1st
Cir. 1989) (rejecting a Fifth Amendment challenge to section 3El.l); United States v. Henry,
883 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989) ("We are unprepared to equate the possibility of
leniency with impermissible punishment.").
101. See United States v. Chevre, 146 F.3d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1998).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 113 F.3d 1528,1533 (10th Cir. 1997).

November 2004]

The Forgotten ConstitutionalRight

This problem is exemplified in cases such as United States v.
Chevre,0 3 United States v. Demes,1° and United States v. Kirkland. In
each of these cases a defendant claimed entrapment at trial, the
district court refused to grant an acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment, and the defendant appealed. 1" Blinded by the defense of
entrapment, the courts gave little or no consideration to the factors set
forth in the Application Notes."° Specifically, the Eighth Circuit stated
that "Chevre's election to argue an entrapment defense ... clearly
shows that he did not accept responsibility for the crime of

103. Chevre, 146 F.3d at 623. Russell Chevre was arrested as part of an undercover
operation. Id. Before trial, Chevre met with an agent with the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension (BCA). Id. During that meeting, Chevre admitted to the agent that he was
carrying approximately eight ounces of methamphetamine and $5,800 in cash at the time of
his arrest. Id. Additionally, Chevre told the agent the name of his supplier and that he had
purchased methamphetamine from that supplier on eight to ten occasions before his arrest.
Id. Chevre claimed entrapment at trial and was convicted. Id.
104. 941 F.2d 220 (3d Cir. 1991). Joseph E. Demes was arrested by an undercover
detective. He was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and
distribution of cocaine. Id. at 221. Demes had reached a plea agreement with the
government in which he agreed to plead guilty and cooperate with the government in its
investigation in exchange for the government's recommendation of an acceptance-ofresponsibility adjustment. Id. Although Demes assisted the authorities, he chose not to take
the plea agreement. Id.
105. 104 F.3d 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Keith Kirkland was arrested following his sale of
crack cocaine to DEA Agent Ronald Woods. Id. at 1403. An informant who knew Kirkland
arranged the sale, and Kirkland admitted selling the drugs. Id. Kirkland disputed the state's
evidence of predisposition to commit the crime by testifying that he had no prior experience
as a drug dealer, was unfamiliar with how drugs are sold, and that he followed the
informant's instructions in completing the sale. Id. at 1403-04. The jury convicted Kirkland.
The presentence report did not recommend an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility
because Kirkland stated that he was entrapped. Id. at 1404.
106. Chevre, 146 F.3d at 625; Kirkland, 104 F.3d at 1404; Demes, 941 F.2d at 222. At
sentencing in the Kirkland case, the following exchange took place:
DEFENSE COUNSEL:... I think even though Mr. Kirkland went to trial in this
matter - and in fact he testified - I think that he accepted responsibility, and I don't
think that his testimony was any different to that effect. He admitted to giving the
undercover officer the drugs.
THE COURT: He said he was entrapped... I don't regard that as ...acceptance of
responsibility.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I don't think that because a person legitimately
claims a legitimate defense, that in claiming that, that he somehow is not accepting
responsibility for what he did. My understanding of what he said was he explained why
he did it. He didn't say he didn't do it. He said, I did it. That's accepting responsibility.
That's a knowing act of what he did. He only explained to the court why he did it. I
don't think that going forward with a legitimate defense is an indication indicating that
he does not accept responsibility.
THE COURT: That is the most absurd argument I have ever heard.
Kirkland, 104 F.3d at 1404.
107. See Chevre, 146 F.3d at 625 (rejecting the defendants request to ignore his assertion
of entrapment and look instead to his admission to the BCA agent that he engaged in the
conduct underlying his conviction).
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In Demes, the Third Circuit described a claim of

entrapment at trial as "the antithesis of the acceptance of
responsibility." 1" In Kirkland, the D.C. Circuit stated that it could not
hypothesize a situation in which a defendant who claimed entrapment
could demonstrate acceptance of responsibility and be entitled to a
1
'
downward adjustment."

A defendant who raises entrapment, like any other defendant,
must accept the foreseeable and constitutionally permissible legal

consequences that flow from strategic decisions. One acceptable
consequence is that the entrapment defense will be rejected by the
jury and the sentencing judge will view that as a credibility
determination. Likewise, asserting the entrapment defense may mean
that the judge will not believe the defendant when she attempts to
show that she is remorseful, and the defendant will be denied the
Section 3E1.1 adjustment."' The threat of ignoring the leniency

factors in the Application Notes creates a very real pressure against a
defendant's constitutional right to present the entrapment defense.
The defendant, believing that an unsuccessful entrapment defense
might prejudice her sentence, may decide to accept a plea bargain

rather than assert her constitutional right to present the entrapment
defense.
A prosecutor, when engaged in the negotiation phase of plea
bargaining,112 may confront the defendant with the risk of more severe
108. Id. In reality, however, Chevre admitted not only the conduct comprising the
offense of conviction, but at least eight other offenses as well. In addition, he voluntarily
assisted law enforcement officials by revealing the name of his supplier, and he was not
offered a deal in exchange for that information. Id. Assistance to law enforcement officials is
a factor that is supposed to be taken into account when a defendant who goes to trial
requests the adjustment. See USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.l(e). Admission of criminal conduct is
also supposed to be taken into consideration. See USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.1(a). In Chevre's
case, it is beyond dispute that Chevre both assisted law enforcement and admitted his
criminal conduct.
109. Demes, 941 F.2d at 222. The court upheld the district court's determination that the
downward adjustment was unwarranted, explaining that it is "difficult to reconcile Deme's
claim of entrapment with his contention that he accepted responsibility." Id. The court left
the door open by saying that "it is conceivable to hypothesize a case in which a plea of
entrapment would not be inconsistent with the acceptance of responsibility;" it immediately
closed that door, however, by pointing out that the claim of entrapment was "made by a
person who in no circumstances could have had a justification for possession of the cocaine."
Id. There was no discussion of whether the defendant assisted law enforcement, admitted his
criminal conduct, or even whether the defendant appeared to be remorseful.
110. See Kirkland, 104 F.3d at 1405. Ultimately, the court rested its decision on the fact
that a defendant who claims entrapment contests his intent to commit the crime that is a
factual element of guilt. Id.; see also supra Part I. There was absolutely no discussion of
whether Kirkland's pretrial behavior merited an acceptance-of-responsibility departure.
111. While this may be a natural consequence, section 3El.1 clearly instructs courts to
examine pretrial statements and conduct to determine if a defendant who proceeded to trial
is deserving of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. USSG § 3E1.1.
112. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of counsel at plea negotiations,
see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970), the need for a public record indicating
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punishment even though that risk has a "discouraging effect on the
defendant's assertion of his trial rights."" 3 Imposing these "difficult
choices" on a defendant is a permissible part of a system which allows
the negotiation of pleas." 4 There is, however, a line that divides the
constitutional from the unconstitutional consequences. That line is
defined by the distinction between plea bargaining, which presents a
defendant with a benefit/detriment choice prior to trial, and
presenting a defense at trial, which presents a defendant with the
wholly negative antecedent of being foreclosed from an acceptance-ofresponsibility adjustment. Put another way, "difficult choices" become
unconstitutional when the "choice" is restricted to selecting among
harms. In the plea-bargain context, the defendant is required to
choose between forgoing trial with the certainty that he will receive a
lesser sentence either because the charges will be less severe or
because he will receive an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment,
and going to trial with the possibility of more severe charges but also
with the possibility of being acquitted of all charges. In this context,
however, the defendant has already chosen to go to trial and the per se
rule places a restriction on what the defendant can present once there.
The defendant must either forgo the right to present the entrapment
defense or forgo the right to be considered for the acceptance-ofresponsibility adjustment. When the risk of more severe punishment
in the plea-bargain "choice," becomes the certainty of more severe
punishment under the per se bar, the line has been crossed.
The Supreme Court has cautioned that "not every burden on the
exercise of a constitutional right, and not every encouragement to
waive such a right, is invalid."' 5 For example, Section 3E1.1 provides
an incentive to plead guilty" 6 that does not violate the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to trial" 7 because it does not constitute a "per
se policy of punishing those who elect to stand trial" and "the leniency
decision is an individualized one, not based merely on the defendant's
decision to go to trial."' 8 A per se rule against eligibility for the
that a plea was voluntarily and knowingly made, see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242
(1969), and the requirement that a prosecutor's plea bargaining promise must be kept, see
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
113. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1977).
114. Id.
115. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978).
116. See USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n.3 (explaining that the entry of guilty plea along with the
admission of the conduct comprising the offense and any additional relevant conduct will
constitute "significant evidence" of acceptance of responsibility).
117. United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1362 (7th Cir. 1992) ("It is well
established under the so-called unconstitutional conditions doctrine that a defendant may
not be subjected to more severe punishment for exercising his or her constitutional right to
stand trial." (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1980))).
118. Id. at 1362-63 (collecting cases).
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adjustment for defendants who proceed to trial would mean that the
leniency decision is no longer an individualized decision. While
denying a reduction in sentence for leniency in an individual case is
not a penalty implicating the exercise of the constitutional right to
trial, a per se rule against eligibility for leniency is. The exercise of the
constitutional right to present a defense, just like the exercise of any
other constitutional right, may diminish the defendant's chances of
being granted the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment because it is
likely that there is less evidence of acceptance of responsibility to
weigh in the defendant's favor.119 As the right to present a defense
stands on equal constitutional footing with other rights protected by
the Sixth Amendment, 20 however, a court cannot ignore the evidence
of contrition simply because the defendant exercised his constitutional
right to present the entrapment defense.121
Courts do have a legitimate interest which can be asserted into the
constitutional calculus. Historically, the Supreme Court's treatment of
the constitutional right to present a defense has dealt with evidentiary
or procedural rules or rulings affecting the presentation of defense
evidence. 2 In general, evidentiary rules are concerned with reliability
and procedural rules tend to focus on judicial economy, regularization,
and procedural reciprocity. 123 The Court typically examines the
fairness of a rule or ruling to the accused. 124 Therefore, there are
instances in which the constitutional right to present a defense may be
outweighed by other interests."2
Nonetheless, in Rock v. Arkansas the Supreme Court concluded
that restrictions on the right to present criminal-defense evidence can
be constitutional only if they "accommodate other legitimate interests
in the criminal trial process" and are not "arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.' 26 One of the

119. See United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460, 1468 (9th Cir. 1993).
120. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 18 (1967)).
121. See LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 1468 (explaining, in a case involving the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, that the court may not "discount evidence
of contrition because of a refusal to discuss the facts of the case with the probation officer").
122. See Clinton, supra note 86, at 796 (extrapolating a constitutional test from the many
cases dealing with the constitutional right to present a defense).
123. See id. at 796-97.
124. Id.
125. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), in which the Supreme Court upheld the
exclusion of a defense witness's testimony as a sanction for defense counsel's discovery-rule
violation. The Court stated that rules providing for pretrial discovery serve the interests
protected by the Compulsory Process Clause in providing a "full and truthful disclosure of
critical facts." Id. at 412.
126. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).

November 2004]

The Forgotten ConstitutionalRight

central purposes involved is in satisfying the defendant's and society'
at-large's interest in "accurate adjudication."127
Putting forth all
evidence bearing on the circumstances surrounding the commission of
the crime furthers that interest. The procedural interest of the courts
must be balanced with the societal interest in accurate adjudication. In
Crane v. Kentucky,"~ for example, the Supreme Court held that,
"exclusion of... exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the
basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and 'survive the
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing." 29 Crane, therefore, serves
as a cautionary note to circuits that fail to adequately justify
application of a per se rule.
The circuits that have created per se rules have justified their
actions by focusing on the theoretical inconsistency between
entrapment and acceptance of responsibility. 3 ° As previously
explained, however, the receipt of an acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment can be consistent with the entrapment defense. Evidence
of entrapment, much like evidence of the circumstances surrounding a
confession, would be essential to a defendant's argument for acquittal.
It is true that in the context of the acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment evidence is not actually being excluded. Interpreting the
Section 3E1.1 adjustment to exclude defendants who present evidence
of entrapment, though, could assert enough pressure to completely
discourage use of the entrapment defense.
The uncertainty that comes along with the choice to raise
entrapment and possibly not receive the Section 3E1.1 adjustment or
to plead guilty and be virtually guaranteed the adjustment is
constitutionally permissible discouragement. What is impermissible is
for the courts to leverage the per se bar against all defendants who
would claim entrapment. The pressures asserted by a per se rule are
far-reaching. A defendant's lawyer will advise her that raising the
defense would preclude the adjustment if she is found guilty; this
knowledge then puts the defendant in a position to roll the

127. Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1391 (1991) (arguing that the Court's treatment of the constitutional
right to present a defense, a truth furthering right, does not evidence a true commitment to
accurate adjudication).
128. 476 U.S. 683 (1986). In Crane, the Court found that the constitutional right to
present a defense was violated when the defendant was prevented from introducing evidence
of the circumstances surrounding his confession. Crane, 476 U.S. at 690-91. The Court
explained that "an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard"
and that right "would be an empty one" if the states, without valid justification, "were
permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a confession
when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence." Id. at 690.
129. Crane, 476 U.S. at 690-91 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656
(1984)).
130. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
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constitutional dice. That pressure infringes on defendants'
constitutional right to present a defense because it assumes that all
defendants who claim entrapment are not credible and are
undeserving of the Section 3E1.1 adjustment regardless of their pretrial conduct and other individual circumstances. Taking away the
possibility of leniency from an entire class of defendants simply
because they claimed entrapment at trial is offensive to the
defendants' constitutional right to present a defense. If it is the
possibility of leniency that saved Section 3E1.1 from constitutional
places Section 3E1.1 on
attack,3 then removing that possibility
132
precarious constitutional ground.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Corbitt v. New Jersey, stated that
"[w]here the legislature, prosecutor, judge, or all three deliberately
employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a defendant to
tender a plea of guilty and where they do so with the objective of
penalizing a person's reliance on his legal rights such action is patently
unconstitutional.' 1 33 Such is the case here. The Supreme Court has
very clearly stated that "[t]o punish a person because he has done
what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the
most basic sort."' 134 In these circumstances, a defendant may enter into
a plea bargain rather than proceed to trial with a legitimate

131. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
132. In interpreting an earlier version of the Sentencing Guidelines, the circuit courts
split over whether a defendant could be denied an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment
because he refused to make self-incriminating statements related to conduct included in
counts to which he had not pled guilty. Compare United States v. Piper, 918 F.2d 839 (9th
Cir. 1990) (finding that requiring a defendant to accept responsibility other than for the
count to which he pled guilty in order to receive a reduction would violate the defendant's
Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself); United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623
(2d Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Perex-Franco, 873 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1989) (same),
with United States v. Ross, 920 F.2d 1530 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that to deny a defendant a
reduction because he will not acknowledge the full extent of his criminal behavior places no
unconstitutional burden on the defendant's right against self incrimination); United States v.
Gordon, 895 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010 (11th
Cir. 1989) (same). To resolve the controversy, the Sentencing Commission amended the
Application Notes to read:
Note that a defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively admit, relevant conduct
beyond the offense of conviction in order to obtain a reduction under subsection (a). A
defendant may remain silent in respect to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction
without affecting his ability to obtain a reduction under this subsection.
USSG § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 1(a) (2002). Thus, the Sentencing Commission sided with the courts
that found it unconstitutional to make a defendant admit conduct to which he did not plead
guilty to remain eligible for the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. In so doing, the
Sentencing Commission reaffirmed once again its aversion to rules that completely take
away the possibility of leniency.
133. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 232 n.7 (1978) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
134. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 738 (1969)).
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entrapment defense because she knows that if the entrapment defense
is unsuccessful she will be penalized, in the form of the court's refusal
to consider an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment, for the
exercise of her right to present the entrapment defense. This result
will be obtained regardless of the remorse shown by the defendant.
Thus, to prevent this unconstitutional penalty, the Section 3E1.1
adjustment must be interpreted to allow defendants who proceed to
trial to claim entrapment to remain eligible for the adjustment. Such a
construction protects the delicate constitutional balance created by
Section 3E1.1.
CONCLUSION

This Note shows that the defense of entrapment is consistent with
the Federal Sentencing Guideline's acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment. In drafting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the
Sentencing Commission attempted to lessen the sentencing disparity
that resulted from pre-guideline sentencing. The Commission reserved
some sentencing flexibility by creating adjustments to the guidelines,
such as the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. The entrapment
defense fits into the exception in Section 3E1.1 Application Note 2,
which allows defendants who proceed to trial to receive the
adjustment, because entrapment is not a challenge to factual guilt, but
rather a challenge as to whether the statute applies to the defendant's
conduct.
This interpretation of the statute safeguards the constitutional
right of defendants to present an entrapment defense at trial. It also
allows the punishment a defendant receives to be based on her
individual circumstances, thus furthering the basic sentencing purpose
of just deserts. When courts create per se rules preventing defendants
who claim entrapment to receive the acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment, they not only violate defendants' constitutional right to
present a defense, but also take away a sentencing court's ability to
create a fair and just sentence. The Sentencing Commission set forth
factors to determine whether a defendant has accepted responsibility
for his crime. Therefore, these factors should guide the sentencing
court's determination, and not a defendant's entrapment defense. As
the entrapment defense can be consistent with the acceptance-ofresponsibility adjustment, the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment solely on the basis of an entrapment defense is a violation
of the constitutional right to present a defense.
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